Equilibrium-based (SFE) bidding strategy in electricity markets. It is assumed that every Generation Company (GenCo) has some generation units and bids a Linear Supply Function (LSF) for each of its units to the Independent System Operator (ISO). The problem is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem; in the inner level, ISO clears the market to maximize social welfare; in the outer level, each GenCo tries to maximize its individual welfare. The proposed method is used to solve the outer-level problem using an iterative algorithm, in which LSF coe cients are parameterized. The formulation is developed for both elastic and non-elastic demands for single-and multi-generator cases and also for integrated energy and Spinning Reserve (SR) markets with three models of competitions: a-, b-, and k-parameterization. Three sample networks are used to evaluate the proposed method. The results show that the proposed method is e ective and accurate for GenCos' strategic bidding in electricity markets compared with other optimization algorithms.
Introduction
Electricity markets have provided opportunities for competing and gaining more revenues for market participants by optimal bidding strategies [1] . This kind of market with imperfect competition is called oligopoly market, and the participants trying to raise market price by their strategic bidding are known as price makers. Generally, there are three main methods for choosing strategic bidding in these oligopoly markets: market price forecasting, rivals' bidding modeling, and game-based rivals' strategic behavior simulating [2] .
Game theory is used as a tool to analyze electricity market, considering the fact that the price makers react to their rivals' strategies to maximize their pro t [3] . Based on game theory, several competitive models have been proposed in the literature to analyze the behavior of GenCos' bidding strategies such as Bertrand, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). Only SFE can make a relationship between the price and quantity of GenCo's bid, and only this model is the closest to the actual behavior of players [4] . The SFE was introduced by Klemperer and Mayer [5] , but the Linear Supply Function (LSF) was used in [6] and has ever since been used in various papers to model participants' behaviors in the electricity markets.
In [7] , the LSF parameterization is summarized into four classi cations. Three of these have one degree of freedom for strategic variables, i.e. slope parameterization, intercept parameterization, and similar parameterization of slope and intercept. In the last one, with two degrees of freedom, the slope and intercept are parameterized arbitrarily. Although it was explained in [8] that the arbitrary parameterization of the slope and intercept gives more realistic results, using this model is di cult because it may lead to several equilibrium points [9] . In many papers, the rst three methods have been used to model the behavior of market players.
GenCos can gain more pro t in the market with various products (e.g., energy [8] , reserve [10] , reactive power [11] , and heat [12] ). Ancillary services, such as spinning reserves, play a signi cant role in ensuring the stability of restructured power systems [13] . In the early years of electricity market, energy and ancillary services used to be settled in separate markets; however, there is wide consensus today that energy and reserve should be o ered and cleared simultaneously in integrated markets to minimize the overall cost of supplying energy and provision of reserve [14] . In recent years, various papers have dealt with the simultaneous settlement of energy and Spinning Reserve (SR) [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . In [18] a thorough literature review on joint energy and reserve markets modeling is presented.
The main purpose of the power system restructuring is to maximize the social welfare by increasing competition in the market, and this allows the market participants to maximize their own individual profits [20] . For an individual player, searching for the optimized bidding strategy is based on the information about or estimation of the rivals' actions. Recently, bilevel optimization method has been used to optimize the producers' bidding strategy. In the outer level, each GenCo tries to maximize its individual welfare by adjusting its supply function parameters; in the inner level, ISO tries to maximize the social welfare [21] . To solve these two problems, authors have utilized various tools of optimization such as BA algorithm [3] , Lagrangian relaxation [17] , Q-learning [22] , and genetic algorithm [23] .
The contribution of this paper is presenting a new analytical solution method for producers' bidding strategy problem in oligopoly power markets. In this method, a new iterative algorithm has been used to solve the outer level of the bi-level optimization problem. Considering the rivals' logical action, LSF parameters can be adjusted using the proposed method. The proposed method is developed for single-generator and multi-generator GenCos strategic biddings in integrated energy and reserve markets with both elastic and non-elastic demands and with resource constraint. Some of the advantages of the proposed method are mentioned in the following, which are proven and shown by an example in the numerical result section:
-Its simplicity compared with other solution tools such as GA; -Not su ering from the problems of convergence; -High convergence speed with low iteration number. The rest of the paper are structured as follows: formulation of market settlement is discussed in Section 2; the proposed method is explained in Section 3; the numerical results are shown in Section 4; the paper is concluded in Section 5.
Market settlements 2.1. Market assumptions
Imagine that there are G numbers of GenCos in the market; each GenCo has g generation units (generators), and these units can simultaneously bid in both energy and spinning reserve markets. First, the demand is assumed to be non-elastic (in the next section, the relationships are extended to elastic demand cases). The overall costs of energy and reserve services for unit k of GenCo i are respectively shown by convex quadratic functions as follows:
According to Eqs. (1) and (2), the Marginal Cost (MC) of energy and reserve for unit k of GenCo i can be de ned: MC e ik = a ik q ik + b ik ;
MC r ik = ik R ik + # ik ;
where q ik and R ik are the quantities for the energy and reserve markets, respectively. Due to the low number of players in electricity markets, these markets' performances are based on oligopoly markets. In oligopoly markets, as mentioned in introduction, some players can a ect the Market-Clearing Price (MCP).
In such a case, MCP and quantity dispatched to each GenCo depend not only on the decisions made by a rm, but also on its rivals' actions in the markets. Imagine that GenCo G i bids a Linear Supply Function (LSF) for each of its own units to the Independent System Operator (ISO) in the form of Eqs. (5) and (6) (6) where ik and ik are the strategic variables of unit k in the energy market, and ik and ik are its strategic variables for reserve market. ISO clears energy and reserve markets based on GenCos' bidding, demand, and reserve requirements for system security.
The ISO problem
The goal of ISO is to maximize the social welfare. If demand is non-elastic, the maximization of the social welfare equals the minimization of the cost of energy supply and reserve services. In [24] , a strategic game model in the form of a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) is introduced, in which supplier's bidding problem is formulated as a bi-level optimization problem. In the inner level, ISO clears the market based on the suppliers' bids to maximize the social welfare. Based on that method, Bautista et al. [15] has presented an oligopoly model for the integrated markets of energy and reserve, where the bids are in the form of constant prices.
In this paper, considering the settlement mechanism of the uniform pricing, the ISO problem is solved through the MPEC model, and the results are used to solve the GenCo's problem (i.e., outer level). For simplicity, in this section, it is assumed that every GenCo has only one generator; but, in the next section, the formulation will be extended to the multi-generator case. Accordingly, if the bids of GenCos for energy and reserve markets are in the form of Eqs. (5) and (6), the formulation of simultaneous settlement of these two markets for the non-elastic demand cases will be: min X (0:5 j q 2 j + j q j + 0:5 j R 2 j + j R j );
s.t. q i + R i q max i ; 
Eq. (7) shows the overall cost of producing energy and spinning reserve services that ISO calculates based on the GenCos' bidding. Eq. (8) [16] . In this paper, SR requirement for system security is considered 10% of the total demand (i.e., Q SR = 1 10 Q D ) like [26] . By writing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition for primary problems (7)- (10) 
For other non-constrained GenCos (k 2 fG Ig) whose coe cient k is equal to zero, we have:
By solving Eqs. (16) and (18) for the energy market, we have:
Substituting Eqs. (20) and (21) 
where Eqs. (23) and (26) show the energy and reserve market prices, respectively. In addition, Eqs. (24) and (27) show the quantities of power and SR allocated to constrained generator i, respectively; (25) and (28) show the quantities of power and reserve allocated to non-constrained generator k, respectively. In these equations, coe cient i is the marginal cost of the capacity constraint. For non-constrained GenCos, i equals zero, while, for the constrained GenCos, it is a positive value that increases the price of energy and reserve services according to Eqs. (23) and (26) . In fact, what has caused GenCo i to be constrained is its lower bidding price compared to its rivals; in other words, to increase the social welfare, ISO gives the generation priority to cheaper producers. When cheaper GenCo i has to have generation at its maximum capacity, the share of more expensive GenCos increases because demand is not elastic; therefore, the market price rises. The way to calculate coe cient i is shown in [17] .
The GenCo problem
The revenue of a GenCo equals the di erence between the income from sales and the generation cost. The income obtained from selling energy and reserve services depends on the market settlement mechanism.
To gain more revenue, the strategic players maximize their expected revenue through supply function parameterization, thereby manipulating the prices in the two markets of energy and spinning reserve. Considering the settlement mechanism of uniform payment for both markets of energy and reserve, the income of company k is:
Rev k = P e :q k + P r :R k :
If the total cost of both energy and reserve for GenCo k is equal to the sum of Eqs. (1) and (2); according to Eq. (29), the pro t is:
Therefore, according to the results of the ISO problem, each GenCo tries to maximize its expected pro t through an optimization process by considering the constraints: max f k g; s.t. Constraints (8) (9) (10) .
(31)
In this paper, assuming that all players know the results of market settlement, each player optimizes its bidding by simulating a non-cooperative game with complete information without imperfect competition. In other words, although the player is not aware of the other player's bidding, he/she can adjust its bidding by having some information such as the possible actions and strategies and also the payo function of its rivals. Accordingly, we can consider the owchart in Figure 1 to determine the optimal bidding strategy of every strategic player, which was similarly used in [24] . This game continues until none of the strategic players considers the change in their bidding strategy useful. This is where we say the Nash equilibrium has been established [1] .
The proposed method
When market competition model is based on LSF, there are four models of parameterization, which are classi ed in the following [7] : 1. a-parameterization: Where each strategic player tries to maximize its expected pro t by parameterizing the slope of supply function. In such a case, the intercept is xed and is usually kept at the real amount of MC (i.e., b i ). In this case, the strategic variable of every strategic player is ; Figure 1 . Flowchart of the optimal bidding strategy.
2. b-parameterization: In this case, the strategic player adjusts the intercept of LSF in order to get more payo . The slope of LSF is xed and is usually kept at the amount of MC. In this case, the strategic variable of each strategic player is ; 3. k-parameterization: In this case, each strategic player changes the slope and intercept similarly, i.e. i = k i :a i and i = k i :b i . GenCo's decision variable is coe cient k i ; 4. (a,b)-parameterization: In this case, the slope and intercept of LSF is manipulated arbitrarily. This model has not been studied in this paper and will be dealt with by future studies.
First, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, formulations of the proposed method for parameterizing of the LSF coe cients to bid in the energy market are explained for the two cases of non-constrained and constrained GenCos, respectively. Then, in Section 3.3, the obtained formulations are generalized for the joint market of energy and reserve. In addition, the relationships for the elastic demand cases are developed in Section 3.4.
Energy market without constraint
In this paper, a new iterative solution method for LSF parameterization is presented, in which LSF coecients are adjusted optimally. To do so, we take the derivative of pro t function according to these coecients. By setting the rst-order derivative at zero, the relationships are obtained, which are presented in the following subsections.
3.1.1. Slope parameterization In this case, it is assumed that every GenCo only parameterizes the slope of its MC. The supply function and the expected payo of GenCo k in the energy market are respectively as follows:
Taking derivative of Eq. (33) according to slope of LSF yields:
According to Eqs. (18) and (20) and by taking derivative of P e and q k based on k , we will have Eqs. (35) and (36), respectively, as follows:
By substituting Eqs. (35) and (36) into Eq. (34) and setting it as zero, we can reach a recursive relationship such as Eq. (37) to parameterize the slope in an iterative game according to the owchart of Figure 1 :
where t is the number of iterations. For each iterative method, there is the need for both initial point and stop condition. To initiate the process, we can use the real value of slope of MC. Also, Eq. (38) is used in this paper as the convergence condition of recurrence, where " is a small number like 1 10 3 : 
Taking the derivative of Eq. (33) according to k yields:
Comparing Eq. (40) with Eqs. (18) and (20) and by some simpli cation, Relation (41) can be obtained as a recursive equation to iteratively adjust coe cient k of GenCo k:
The intercept of MC can be used as the initial value for k , and Relation (38) can be used as stop condition.
k-parameterization
In this case, as mentioned before, each GenCo tries to adjust the slope and intercept simultaneously and similarly. The proposed supply function of GenCo k for the energy market is:
Deriving Eq. (33) with respect to coe cient k k yields:
Comparing Eq. (43) to Eqs. (18) and (20) and by some simpli cation, Eq. (44) can be obtained as a recursive equation to iteratively adjust coe cient k k of GenCo k:
In this method, we can set k (0) i = 1 as the initial point. Moreover, we can use Eq. (38) as the condition of recursion stoppage.
Energy market with constrained GenCos
Imagine that there is only one constrained generator in the market (GenCo i), which is the cheapest. The relationships obtained in the previous subsection can still be used with little changes to choose the optimal bidding strategy. If the power allocated to GenCo i equals its proposed capacity, then the other GenCos have to supply the remained demand. This means that ISO can use Q D q max i instead of Q D in the market clearing. Therefore, the bidding of constrained GenCo has no e ect on the market settlement price, the power allocated to other GenCos, and their revenues.
By substituting Eq. (16) 
Therefore, ignoring GenCo i's bidding parameters, Eqs. (37), (41), and (44) can be modi ed as follows, where i is the constrained GenCo:
3.3. Integrated market (energy and reserve) 3.3.1. Without constrained GenCos Imagine that each GenCo is able to bid as linear supply function in both energy and reserve markets. As long as no GenCo is constrained, the formulations of Section 3.1 can be used to choose the optimal bidding strategy for both energy and reserve markets independently. Therefore, the LSF-parameterization for participating in the energy market is exactly the relationships in the previous subsection, and the relationships for participating in the reserve market will be:
With constrained GenCos
In this case, we assume that only GenCo i has encountered the capacity constraint. We can still use the relationship stated in the previous sub-section for LSF parameterizing in both energy and reserve markets, with the di erence that we have i 6 = 0 for the constrained GenCo. Dual variable, i , which is the marginal cost of the capacity constraint, shows the relation between these two markets, thereby the players update their tendency toward participating in these two markets. According to Eqs. (16) and (17), we have: r = f e i i q i g + i + i R i :
The phrase in the brackets in Eq. (53) shows the opportunity cost of supplying the reserve service, instead of producing energy equal to the di erence between the MCP and the bidding of GenCo i to the energy market [27] . This means that a constrained GenCo has to decide what extent of its capacity must be allocated to reserve and what extent to the energy market; Eq. (53) shows the opportunity cost of this decision. It also shows that the bidding of a nonconstrained GenCo ( k = 0) in any of the markets will not have any e ect on its bidding in another market. Therefore, considering i and the relationships stated above, we can determine the GenCo's optimal bidding strategy for participating in the integrated markets of energy and reserve.
Elastic loads
Let us imagine that demand is sensitive to price changes, and its o er is a linear function with a negative slope, but is assumed non-strategic. In this case, ISO aggregates total demands to a linear function as in Eq. (54):
By the similar proof mentioned in Section 2.2, markets clearing price with elastic demand can be determined as in Eq. (55): 
LSF parameterization for GenCos bidding strategy in the energy market with elastic load will be as follows: 
GenCos with multi-generation units
In this section, it is assumed that every GenCo has multiple generators and bids a LSF for each generation unit. The formulation in the previous sections for b-parameterization in the energy market is extended. Based on Eq. (5), the market-clearing price can be rewritten as follows:
where:
The quantity generated by unit k of GenCo i is calculated as follows:
The total pro t of GenCo i can be written as follows: 
In intercept parameterization, the slopes of LSF bids are xed and equal to the marginal cost coe cients; therefore, the term (P MC ij ) can be written as follows: 
By solving this system of equation and some simplications, the relationship for intercept-parameterization is obtained as follows:
The obtained formula is like Relation (41), the case in which every GenCo has only one generator, with the exception that in Eq. (71), q i is the total quantity generated by all units of GenCo i, andÂ i is calculated excluding all the slopes of GenCo i's LSF bids. For elastic loads, as proved in the previous subsection, it can be shown that the formula for interceptparameterization is like Eq. (71) with the exception thatÂ i is calculated as follows:
where 0 is elastic demand price slope.
Simulation results
To study the di erent aspects of the proposed method and its accuracy, three test networks utilized in [15, 23, 28] are used. The analysis will be done in three parts: at rst, using the network in [23] , the accuracy of the proposed method in choosing the bid for the energy market will be investigated, and it will be shown that the proposed method is accurate similar to metaheuristic approaches, yet it is faster in solving bidding strategy problems in pool-based power markets. Then, using the network [28] , application of the proposed method for multi-generation unit case is considered, and the capability of the proposed method is proven. Finally, using the network like [15] , application of the proposed method for choosing the bid in the integrated energy and SR market will be investigated.
Energy market-single-generator case
In [23] , using a Co-evolutionary Genetic Algorithm (CGA) for determining the market equilibrium, the linear supply function bidding parameters to participate in the energy market based on di erent competition models have been adjusted. The data of GenCos' cost function are represented in Table 1 . Imagine that demand has non-zero elasticity and the aggregated demand parameters are 0 = 10$/(MWh.GWh) and 0 = 350$/MWh. In this part, the GenCos' bidding parameters will be adjusted using the proposed method and then compared with the study results of Zhang et al. in [23] . (23) to (25), the market equilibrium with perfect competition for these ve GenCo systems is shown in Table 2 . According to the data of Table 1 , G 2 and G 5 are the most expensive producers and G 3 is the cheapest. Therefore, ISO gives the highest share of production to G 3 and the least to G 2 and G 5 in order to increase the social welfare. Since the market participants are paid uniform, the cheapest GenCo, i.e. G 3 , obtains the highest pro t and the expensive GenCos, i.e. G 2 and G 5 , obtain the lowest pro t.
Oligopoly energy market
In this case, it is supposed that all ve GenCos are strategic and bid strategically in an oligopoly energy market; so, they try to maximize their expected pro t by deviating the market price from its competitive value. To study the e ects of GenCos' decisions on market settlement, all the three competition models, i.e. a-, b-, and k-parameterizations, should be investigated. Considering that the capacity of the GenCos is large enough, the results of LSF-parameterizations based on the proposed relationships in Section 3.4 are shown in Table 3 . Figure 2 shows the convergences of supply function parameters. According to the similarity of the marginal cost parameters of G 2 and G 5 , the same diagrams are drawn for both.
Discussing the results
According to the results shown in Tables 1 to 3 , we can conclude as following:
1. It can be seen from Table 3 that the proposed method leads to the same results shown in [23] for all three competition models of LSF parameterization. As explained in introduction section, one of the speci c characteristics of the proposed method is its simplicity. In [23] , the game is supposed to be with complete information and the market equilibrium is calculated by using CGA, but it can be easily determined using our proposed iterationbased equations, and having these equations, we do not need to use optimizing tools; 2. There are several techniques for evaluating the performance of optimization algorithms. In cases where meta-heuristic optimization algorithms, such as the genetic algorithm, have to be evaluated, the most common performance metric is the total Number of objective Function Evaluations (NFE). Other than that, another metric is the time needed for completing the task, but that is directly proportional to the NFE metric. The better approach has the lower NFE and time. NFE for the proposed method is equal to the number of iterations, i.e., 10; but, for GA, NFE is equal to 5470. The time of simulation is 6.7 seconds for GA and 0.023 seconds for the proposed method. Therefore, these two important criteria con rm that the proposed method can be faster; 3. In simulating program, Relation (38) is used as the stoppage condition in which " equals 1 10 3 . In reality, this measure is too small for pro t. The number of iterations needed for convergence of all the three models of parameterization with di erent values for " is shown in Table 4 . It can be seen that with bigger numbers for ", the algorithm is converged with less iteration. In [29] , the negotiation for settling the market is explained. Therefore, for a market with negotiated settling mechanism, the proposed method can be pro table for GenCo due to convergence with less iteration; 4. By comparing Tables 2 and 3 , it can be seen that the MCP in all incomplete competition mod- 
Strategic variable
Number of iterations " = 10 3 els (a-, b-, or k-parameterization) is more than that in complete competition. The MCP in aparameterization is more than those in the two other models, and in b-parameterization, it is less than those in the two others. In addition, since the demand is supposed to be elastic, it reacts to this price increase, and with this increase, the demand will reduce. In fact, in complete competition case, the demand is the highest (Q D = 32:31 MW), but in b-parameterization, demand is the lowest (Q D = 31:71 MW). Thus, in the case of a-parameterization, the highest price deviation and capacity withholding is done. On the contrary, it can be seen that competitive model for k-parameterization shows more moderate results compared with the two other models. Therefore, like what was explained in [27] , k-parameterization leads to results closer to the real markets.
Energy market-multi-generator case
In this case, we study a network with three GenCos in which every GenCo has more than one unit. Table 5 shows generators' cost function parameters, which are like the network studied in [28] . Total demand is assumed to be 1000 MW. Table 6 shows the market simulation results under complete competition condition where every GenCo bids its marginal price for each of its units to ISO, and Table 7 shows the market simulation under incomplete competition condition. It is assumed that the GenCos are allowed to adjust only the intercept (bparameterization) using Eq. (71). The comparison of the results of Tables 6 with 7 shows that because of tacit collusion, each GenCo can increase the LSF intercept. This increasing trend continues until convergence condition, like Eq. (38), is satis ed.
For veri cation of the proposed method, assume that each GenCo has only one generator, i.e. the six generators in Table 5 are six GenCos and they adjust their strategic parameters based on Eq. (41). The market simulation results are shown in Table 8 . The comparison of the results of Table 6 with those of Table 8 shows that the pro t of each generator in a multi-generator case is greater than its pro t in a single-generator case, with bigger adjusted intercept parameters. For example, if generators g 1 and g 2 form GenCo 1 (G 1 ) and bid with respect to each other in the multi-generator case, they would gain 4119.6 and 1328.6$, respectively, and the total pro t of G 1 would be 5448.2$, as shown in Table 7 ; but, in the single-generator case, g 1 and g 2 gain 3213 and 1078$, respectively. Assuming that they form G 1 as a GenCo, the total pro t of G 1 would be 4292$ that is less than the total pro t of multi-generator case. It can be said that the multi-generator case is the same as explicit collusion case where some generators coalesce into a GenCo.
Integrated energy and spinning reserve
In this part, the behavior of GenCos for participating in the integrated energy and spinning reserve market using the proposed method is studied. The GenCos' energy and reserve cost function parameters according to data in [15] and with a little change are shown in Table 9 . It is supposed that the demand is non-elastic and equals 1500 MW. As a result, according to the explanations in Section 2.2, the SR requirement for the network will be 150 MW. To study the proposed method, ve cases in two parts are considered, in which the completely competitive market and oligopoly market with three players are studied, respectively.
Perfect competition market
In this section, the market is assumed to be perfect competitive. Market without constrained GenCo and Market with constrained GenCo are analyzed in Cases A and B, respectively.
-Case (A) Without any constrained GenCo: In this case, the market is assumed completely competitive; therefore, all GenCos bid their marginal cost to the ISO and none of them manipulates its o er to maximize its revenue. It is also supposed that none of the GenCos faces capacity constraint, and the total production and spinning reserve for each GenCo is less than its total capacity. The results of market settlement under these conditions are shown in the rst row of Table 10 . It can be seen that because G 1 is constrained, its coe cient 1 will be non-zero, but for G 2 and G 3 , it equals zero because none of them is constrained. By comparing rows 1 and 2 from Table 10 , it can be seen that the GenCos pro t in Case B is more than that in Case A, which is due to xed load and constraining GenCo G 1 .
More capacity is allocated to the GenCos that are more expensive; as a result, the market price in both energy and reserve markets will increase, leading to an increase in GenCos' pro t. The price markups for energy and reserve markets are 14.1 and 5.1, respectively. In Case A, where none of the GenCos is constrained, ISO allocates most demands and SR requirements to the cheaper GenCo G 1 , up to a point that its bidding is not higher than that of the others. While in Case B, where G 1 , the cheaper GenCo, is bounded, it can be seen that the dispatch by ISO is the way that most of the capacity of cheaper and constrained GenCo G 1 is allocated to the energy market and the rest of its capacity is allocated to supplying the SR services. This is due to more quantity and price of the energy market with respect to the SR market.
Oligopoly integrated market
In this part, each GenCo plays as a price-maker and tries to set its bids by simulation of its competitors' actions logically and in accordance with relationships in Section 3. It is also supposed that each GenCo maximizes its pro t adjusting the LSF parameters in both integrated energy and reserve markets. -Case (C) Integrated market with a strategic GenCo: In this case, suppose that G 1 is the only strategic GenCo in the market which tries to obtain the highest pro t by participating in energy and reserve markets using LSF parameterization. None of the GenCos is constrained and the production of all the GenCos is less than their capacity. The market equilibrium is shown in row 3 of Table 10 . By comparing rows 1 and 3 in Tables 10, it can be seen that G 1 tries to maximize its pro t by withholding its capacity through bidding more than competitive level in both energy and reserve markets. The total capacity of G 1 decreases from 779 MW in Case A to 553 MW in Case C, and the most decrease is in the capacity given to the energy market and, as a result, leads to the energy market price deviation from 34$/MW to 52$/MW. G 1 pro t increases from 12:6 10 3 $ in Case A to 15:1 10 3 $ in Case C. Also, it can be seen that although the bidding of the price taker GenCos, i.e., G 2 and G 3 , remains xed as their marginal cost, their pro t increases because of G 1 strategic bidding. This is one of the characteristics of uniform settlement mechanism. -Case (D) Competing in reserve market: In this case, all GenCos are allowed to parameterize the supply function in reserve market, and the energy market is considered competitive. The capacity of G 1 is supposed to be 630 MW. The market equilibrium under this situation is shown in the fourth row of Table 10 . It can be seen from the results that the players manipulate their supply function's coe cients in reserve market and increase the reserve price higher than the competitive level (i.e., Case A). As a result, the GenCos' revenue increases despite the lower production. By comparing the two Cases of B and D, it can be seen that according to the opportunity cost between the two markets, GenCo G 1 allocates 7 MW of its capacity to reserve; therefore, despite the game in reserve market, this GenCo induces a small increase in the market price. Since demand is not elastic, the reserve requirement is xed. Therefore, if cheaper GenCo G 1 decides to supply less reserve, other more expensive GenCos will compensate for this decrease, and thus, the price of spinning reserve services increases. This increase, caused by exercising GenCos' market power, brings them more pro t and, therefore, decreases social welfare. -Case (E) Competition in both energy and SR markets: In this case, we assume that all three GenCos behave strategically and compete with each other in both energy and SR markets; G 1 has the total capacity of 630 MW. The result of integrated market equilibrium is shown in row ve of Table 10 . By comparing the rows of Table 10 , it can be seen that the simultaneous game in both markets results in more payo than in the previous cases. Figure 3 shows the gaming of G 1 for shifting the capacity between these two markets and choosing the best option in an iterative process. Through this game, G 1 learns that the optimal strategy is to decrease 32 MW of its energy capacity (Case B) and allocates this to SR capacity; therefore, the energy market price increases from 48.2$/MWh to 62.82$/MWh. Since market clearings are done simultaneously, this decrease in the energy market leads to the increase in supplying the reserve services, and ISO allocates 48 MW of the total reserve requirement to G 1 than 16MW in Case B. That is the reason why despite the manipulation of the supply function parameters, because of the e ective presence of the cheaper GenCo G 1 , the SR price has not had a noticeable increase just like the energy market. What is important for every GenCo is to get more pro t from both markets of energy and reserve, and all the three GenCos have reached this goal by parameterizing their supply function in this integrated market.
Conclusions
In this paper, a new solution method of suppliers bidding strategy is proposed. The proposed method is based on iterative process and developed for both elastic and non-elastic demands. it is e cient for participating in energy markets and integrated energy and SR markets. The proposed method was also developed for multi-generator cases in which every GenCo has more than one generator (generation unit). The gaming of the producer for allocating the capacity between energy and reserve markets and the opportunity cost between them are also considered in the proposed method. The correctitude of the proposed method and its e ciency was investigated by three case studies. At rst, the accuracy of the proposed bidding strategy for participating in the energy market with ve GenCos test cases and elastic demand was considered, which was studied by Zhang et al. who had adjusted the LSF parameters using CGA. The results of LSF parameterization by the iterative proposed method for all the three models of competitions, i.e. a-, b-, and k-parameterization, show that the proposed method is accurate and e ective, and the results are the same as those shown in the mentioned research through CGA. Some of the advantages of the proposed method can be highlighted as follows:
-Simplicity compared with other solution tools such as GA; -Immunity to the problems of convergence; -High convergence speed with low iteration number.
However, the proposed method can be combined with metaheuristic algorithms, so that a modi ed optimization algorithm with a fast technic for calculating the equilibrium point of the market can be introduced in future studies.
Then, a network with three GenCos, each with two generators, has been used for investigating the capability of the proposed method in producers' bidding strategy for multi-generator GenCo case. The results show that each GenCo achieves more pro t than the complete competition. In addition, it is shown that each generator can achieve more pro t than the singlegenerator case in which each generator is a GenCo and there is no coali cation among the generators. It can be said that the multi-generator case is the same as explicit collusion case where some generators coalesce into a GenCo.
Finally, a network with three GenCos has been used for investigating the integrated energy and SR markets by the proposed method. In this case, it was shown that the proposed method is e ective in participating in the markets with both constrained and non-constrained GenCos. It was also shown that the constrained GenCo learns during an iterative process how much of its overall capacity should be allocated to the energy market to maximize its expected pro t in the integrated market. 
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